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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030454-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea to damaging a jail, a third degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Can a police car in which an arrestee is being detained be an "other 
place of confinement" within the damaging a jail statute? 
A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State ex rel. P.S., 2001 UT App 305, Tf 10, 38 P.3d 303. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes, cited in this brief, are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1999) (the "damaging a jail statute"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201 (Supp. 2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-14.5 (2000); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-101 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (2003). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 A-114 (Supp. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On January 31, 2002, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol (R. 1-3). Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the arresting 
officer's vehicle (R. 3). Defendant then became angry and kicked out the back window 
of the police vehicle (R. 3, 117). 
On February 1, 2002, defendant was charged with damaging a jail, a third degree 
felony, and with driving under the influence of alcohol, interference with an arresting 
officer, driving without insurance, and disorderly conduct, all class B misdemeanors (R. 
1-3). After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all but the last charge (R. 
38-39,40). 
On June 21, 2002, defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover on the damaging 
a jail charge, asserting that a police car is not a "place of confinement" under the 
applicable statute (R. 49-55). After a hearing on July 18, 2002, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion (R. 99-100, 128). 
On March 6, 2003, defendant entered into a plea agreement in which he reserved 
the right to appeal the trial court's ruling (R. 116-120). Pursuant to that agreement, 
defendant pleaded guilty to damaging a jail in return for the State's dismissing the 
because defendant pleaded guilty to the crime and defendant did not include a 
preliminary hearing or plea hearing transcript in the record on appeal, the facts of the 
crime are taken from the probable cause statement in the charging information and from 
defendant's statement in support of the plea. 
2 
remaining counts (R. 118). Defendant was subsequently given a suspended sentence of 
zero-to-five years in prison, a fine, and thirty-six months probation (R. 131-33). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 134). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss 
because, as a matter of law, a police vehicle is not an "other place of confinement" under 
the damaging a jail statute. Because defendant's three-page argument includes only 
random citation to legal authority with no analysis as to how it supports his claim, this 
Court should reject it as inadequately briefed. 
In any case, defendant's claim fails under traditional rules of statutory 
construction. First, the plain meaning of "other place of confinement" is broad enough to 
include a police vehicle in which an arrestee is being detained. Second, an interpretation 
of "other place of confinement" to include places where arrestees may be detained is 
consistent with the policy underlying the statute, which is to protect public places in 
which persons are being restrained for law enforcement purposes. Third, the legislature 
has shown itself capable of limiting the reach of statutes to penal institutions when it 
wants to, and its decision not to do so here must be given force. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
A POLICE CAR IN WHICH AN ARRESTEE IS BEING 
DETAINED IS AN "OTHER PLACE OF CONFINEMENT" 
WITHIN THE DAMAGING A JAIL STATUTE 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have dismissed the damaging a jail 
charge because, as a matter of law, a police car is not an "other place of confinement" 
under the applicable statute. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8. This Court should reject defendant's 
claim either as inadequately briefed or as contrary to the plain language of the statute 
under which defendant was charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 ("the damaging a jail statute") provides: "A person 
who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise 
damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1999) (emphasis added). 
A. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed where he fails to 
identify or apply the relevant rules of statutory construction and 
fails to explain how the legal authority he cites supports his 
claim. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's 
brief "shall contain . . . citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. 
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
4 
see also State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, ^ 67, 57 P.3d 977 (rejecting inadequately briefed 
claim in death penalty case), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 863 (2002); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, % 46 n.5, 37 P.3d 1073. "Implicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the 
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69 
P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the court 
will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, \ 12, 52 P.3d 467. 
This Court simply "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth' on 
behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citation 
omitted). In fact, "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed 
arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. 
Norris, 2001 UT 104, ^  28, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 
138. 
Here, defendant challenges the trial court's interpretation of the phrase, "other 
place of confinement," within the damaging a jail statute. However, nowhere in his 
brief does defendant set forth the traditional rules of statutory construction used to 
interpret statutory language or apply those rules to the damaging a jail statute. See Aplt. 
5 
Br. at 6-9 (referencing doctrine of ejusdem generis only in noting that this Court refused 
to apply it to the damaging a jail statute). 
Moreover, although defendant cites to three published opinions addressing the 
statute, he fails to explain how those opinions or their holdings relate in any way to his 
claim. See Aplt. Br. at 6-8 (citing State v. Perez, 2000 UT App 65, 999 P.3d 579; State 
v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 
1991)). 
Defendant's argument, therefore, is nothing more that "bald citation to authority" 
with no "development of that authority" or "reasoned analysis based on that authority." 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. As a consequence, defendant's argument impermissibly 
'"dump[s] the burden of argument and research'" onto this Court. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 
Tf 20 (citation omitted). Because defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, this Court 
should refuse to reach it. 
B. The plain meaning of the phase "other place of confinement'' is 
broad enough to include a police car in which an arrestee is 
being detained. 
Should this Court excuse defendant's failure to adequately brief his claim, the 
claim nevertheless fails as a matter of statutory construction. 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795; see also Brixen & 
Christopher Architects, P.C v. State, 2001 UT App 210, \ 14, 29 P.3d 650. "[Statutory 
6 
term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted meaning, 
where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^  9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations omitted). 
In addition, "[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole.'" State v. 
Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, If 16, 21 P.3d 249 (quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, If 17, 
5 P.3d 616). Thus, this Court "interprets] the provisions 'in harmony with other 
provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters." Brixen & Christopher Architects, B.C., 2001 UT App 210, [^ 15 (quoting Lyon, 
2000 UT 19, f 17 (additional citation omitted)). 
In this case, defendant claims "other place of confinement" within the damaging a 
jail statute must be interpreted as limited to "a jail, prison or other penal institution" in 
which "an accused person is committed as an inmate." Aplt. Br. at 7, 8. According to his 
argument below, "places of confinement" should be limited to facilities in which 
defendants have been placed "after sentence . . . as opposed to a police car when a 
person's first arrested" (R. 138:6). 
However, nothing in the plain language of the statute even references inmates, let 
alone limits "other place of confinement" to "secure confinement locations, jails, prisons, 
and things of that nature, where a person can be sentenced to as a result of court action" 
(R. 138:6). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418. Moreover, such an interpretation is 
inconsistent with the traditional rules of statutory construction set forth above. 
7 
First, the plain meaning of "place" includes "[a]n area with definite or indefinite 
boundaries; a portion of space" and "[a] building or an area set aside for a specified 
purpose." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at 
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/23/P0342300.html (last visited 3/22/04); see also Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m"W.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book:^Dictionary 
&va=place (last visited 3/22/04) (defining "place" to include "physical environment," "an 
indefinite region or expanse," and "a building or locality used for a special purpose"). 
The plain meaning of "confinement" is "[t]he act of confining or the state of being 
confined." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at 
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/18/C0561800.html (last visited 3/23/04); see also Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi~bin/dictionary7book 
^Dictionarv&va^confmement (last visited 3/22/04). 
The plain meaning of confine is "[t]o keep within bounds; restrict" or "[t]o shut or 
keep in, especially to imprison." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (4th ed. 2000), at http://www.bartlebv.com/61/17/C0561700.html (last visited 
3/23/04); see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=confine (last visited 3/22/04) (defining "confine" to 
include "something (as borders or walls) that encloses" and "something that restrains"). 
Thus, the plain meaning of "other place of confinement" is an other bounded area 
that shuts in or restricts. The back seat of a police car being used to transport an arrestee 
certainly falls within that plain meaning. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 577 S.E.2d 839, 
8 
841 (Ga. App. 2003) (describing defendant, after being arrested and placed in police car, 
as person "who was confined in the police car"); Mar ley v. Huron Valley Men's Facility 
Warden, 418 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Mich. App. 1987) (recognizing that van transporting 
prisoners to court could be "a place of confinement"); State v. Torgrimson, 637 N.W.2d 
345, 350 (Minn. App. 2002) (noting, in discussing Fourth Amendment application to 
police car, that "in some instances, the back seat of the vehicle can act as the equivalent 
of a temporary jail cell"). Cf. Noguchi v. Nakamura, 638 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Haw. App. 
1982) (per curiam) ("Obviously, [an] automobile . . . can be a place of confinement" for 
purposes of false imprisonment); People v. Jackson, 666 N.E.2d 854, 862 (111. App. 1996) 
(noting "confinement usually means enclosure or confinement within something such as a 
house or car"); State v. White, 492 S.E.2d 48, 51 (N.C. App. 1997) (recognizing car as 
"place of confinement" for purposes of kidnapping).2 
Second, this broad reading of "other place of confinement" is consistent with the 
language used in the related juvenile statute. Section 62A-7-201(7) provides: 
2Although defendant cites to Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1990) 
("Clark F), withdrawn on rehryg, 963 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1992) ("ClarkIF), as 
"opin[ing] that an arrest and detention in a parole office did not constitute confinement," 
Aplt. Br. at 8, the issue in that case was whether the petitioner's allegations of 
mistreatment during those events constituted challenges to "conditions of confinement." 
See Clark I, 914 F.2d at 1429. In Clark I, the court held that "conditions of confinement" 
generally only include "'ongoing prison practices and regulations,'" and thus did not 
include the isolated incidents alleged by the petitioner. See id. 
In Clark II, the court withdrew its prior opinion, held that "conditions of 
confinement" included isolated incidents of mistreatment, and concluded that because the 
petitioner was in confinement during the pretrial detention incident, it did not have to 
decide whether the petitioner was also in confinement while he was being held at the 
parole office after his arrest. ClarkII, 963 F.2d at 1364-65. 
9 
A child who willfully and intentionally damages a jail or other place 
of confinement as provided in Section 76-8-418, including a 
detention, shelter, or secure confinement facility [] operated by the 
Division of Juvenile Justice Services, commits an act which would 
be a third degree felony if committed by an adult. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(7) (Supp. 2003); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3A-114 
(Supp. 2003). The clear import of the "including" language is that the locations listed do 
not represent an exhaustive list of what constitutes an "other place of confinement." See, 
e.g., State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545 (Utah 1983) (discussing predecessor to evidence 
rule 404(b) and noting that "the word 'including,' which precedes the list of exceptions 
. . . 'indicates that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive.5") (quoting State v. Forsyth, 741 
P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982)). Where the list sets forth essentially all "penal institutions" 
applicable to juveniles, "other place of confinement" must include places other than such 
penal institutions. 
Moreover, such interpretation is consistent with the public policy evidenced by the 
plain language of the statute and its placement in Title 76, Part 4, "Offenses against 
Public Property." Both demonstrate that the statute was designed to protect public places 
in which persons would be restrained for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., 
Sorenson 's Ranch School v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354, f 12, 36 P.3d 528 (noting court 
can consider "relevant policy considerations" if it finds statutory language ambiguous) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, when the legislature seeks to limit the term "confinement" to reach only 
penal institutions or places of confinement of "inmates," it knows how to do that. See, 
10 
e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309(7)(b) (2003) ("confinement in a state prison, jail, 
institution for confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order 
of the court or sentenced and committed"); Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-14.5(1) (2000) 
("place of confinement of an inmate") (emphasis added); Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-101 
(2003) (defining "prisoner" to include "any person who is in custody of a peace officer 
pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other penal institution") 
(emphasis added); cf. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 641 (Utah 1997) (lead opinion of 
Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (noting that when legislature intends criminal statutes 
to be "tailored to apply only within the confines of prison," it uses language like crimes 
"'committed by a person who is confined in jail or other correctional institution5" 
(citations omitted)). 
The legislature's omission of such limiting language in the damaging a jail statute 
"should 'be taken note of and given effect.5" Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 
UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 
102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973)); see also State ex rel A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah 
App. 1997) (giving force to legislature's failure to include rehabilitation as factor for 
consideration under serious youth offender act where legislature's inclusion of 
rehabilitation as factor under other statutes indicated legislature knew how to include 
such factor when it wanted); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Orme, J., concurring in result) (discussing statute defining when state may appeal in 
criminal cases). 
11 
None of Utah's damaging a jail cases conflict with this result. See State v. Perez, 
2000 UT App 65, 999 P.3d 579; State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993); State 
v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1991)). First, all three of those cases involved 
damage to an actual jail facility. See Perez, 2000 UT App 65, ^ 2 ("Defendant was 
arrested and booked into the Utah County Jail."); Pharris, 846 P.2d at 457 ("Defendant 
was an inmate in the San Juan County Jail. . . ."); Jaimez, 817 P.2d at 823 (noting crime 
occurred at Carbon County jail). Thus, none involved interpretation of the phrase, 
"other place of confinement," within the damaging a jail statute. 
Second, nothing in those cases mandates a limited interpretation of "other place of 
confinement." Although defendant cites to Jaimez for the proposition that "[j]ails, 
prisons and the like are intended to be places of confinement once an accused person is 
committed as an inmate," Aplt. Br. at 8 (citing 'Jaimez at 883"), the pin cite he provides 
does not fall within the Jaimez opinion. In the event defendant intended to cite to page 
823 of the opinion, he cites only to the factual background provided by the court, which 
indicates that the people involved in that incident were "inmates then incarcerated in a 
common area." Jaimez, 817 P.2d at 823. 
The issue in Jaimez was whether the squad room was part of a jail for purposes of 
the statute. This Court held that it was because, "while the squad room was at times 
used for purposes other than confining inmates, it was also used for jail purposes," 
where "one of the major uses of the squad room was to house inmates and to process 
them." 817 P.2d at 827; see also id. ("Because one of the major uses of the squad room 
12 
was to house inmates . . .
 5 we find no error in the court's conclusion that the squad room 
was part of the jail as that term is used in the statute.").3 Nowhere in the Court's decision 
did it discuss the phrase "other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limit 
such places to those that house inmates. Nor does any language within the statute do so. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418. 
Thus, considering the public policy reasons behind the statute, see supra at p. 10, 
Jaimez can easily be interpreted as supporting the conclusion that just because a police 
vehicle is "at times used for purposes other than confining" arrestees, that fact alone 
does not remove the police car from the reaches of the damaging a jail statute. Indeed, 
defendant's own argument below—during which he recognized that even a private 
home can be a "place of confinement" under certain conditions (R. 138:6)—supports 
this conclusion. 
In Pharris, this Court held that defendant's acts of "breaking the cell bunk weld 
and damaging the power generator by flooding the jail ce l l . . . fall within the scope of the 
statute because they caused injury to portions of the jail facility that are essential to its 
functioning." 846 P.2d at 466. As in Jaimez, nowhere did the Court discuss the phrase 
"other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limit such places to those that 
house inmates. 
3The Court also held that "any damage to the facility amounted to an injury" 
under the statute. Id. 
13 
In Perez, this Court considered whether scratching an obscenity into a cell door 
constituted damaging a jail. 2000 UT App 65, f 5. This Court concluded that the statute 
"encompasses any damage to a jail," clarifying that, despite language in Pharris 
suggesting otherwise, the damage "need not impair the functioning of the jail." Id. at 
\ 10. The court also rejected the defendant's suggestion that "the damage inflicted be of 
the same magnitude as those types of damage enumerated in the statute," holding that 
the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply where the term "damages" is neither 
ambiguous nor unconstitutionally vague. Id. at €[flj 11-12. Again, nothing in the opinion 
addressed the phrase "other place of confinement" within the statute, let alone limited 
such places to those that house inmates. 
Because a police vehicle restricting an arrestee is a place of confinement under 
the damaging a jail statute, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss, 
and defendant's appeal fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED f April 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZMIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-8-418. Damaging jails. 
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, 
floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
62A-7-201. Confinement — Facilities — Restrictions [Ef-
fective July 1, 2004]. 
(1) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or 
brought before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may 
not be confined in jails, lockups, or cells used for ordinary criminals or persons 
charged with crime, or in secure postadjudication correctional facilities oper-
ated by the division, except as provided by specific statute and in conformance 
with approved standards. 
(2) (a) Children charged by information or indictment with crimes as a 
serious youth offender under Section 78-3a-602 or certified to stand trial 
as an adult pursuant to Section 78-3a-603 may be detained in a jail or 
other place of detention used for adults. 
(b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section 78-3a-602 or 
78-3a-603 prior to a hearing before a magistrate, or under Subsection 
78-3a-114(3), may only be held in certified juvenile detention accommoda-
tions in accordance with rules promulgated by the division. Those rules 
shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound separation from 
adult inmates. The division certifies facilities that are in compliance with 
the division's standards. 
(3) In areas of low density population, the division may, by rule, approve 
juvenile holding accommodations within adult facilities that have acceptable 
sight and sound separation. Those facilities shall be used only for short-term 
holding purposes, with a maximum confinement of six hours, for children 
alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal oflFense if 
committed by an adult. Acceptable short-term holding purposes are: identifi-
cation, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and allowance of 
adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances regarding release or 
transfer to a shelter or detention facility. 
(4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would be a 
criminal offense if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding rooms in 
local law enforcement agency facilities for a maximum of two hours, for 
identification or interrogation, or while awaiting release to a parent or other 
responsible adult. Those rooms shall be certified by the division, according to 
the division's rules. Those rules shall include provisions for constant supervi-
sion and for sight and sound separation from adult inmates. 
(5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(6) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of children 
under 18 years of age who require detention care prior to trial or examination, 
or while awaiting assignment to a home or facility, as a dispositional placement 
under Subsection 78-3a-118(2)(f)(i) or 78-3a-901(3)(a), and of youth offenders 
under Subsection 62A-7-112(8). The division shall provide standards for 
custody or detention under Subsections (2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall determine 
and set standards for conditions of care and confinement of children in 
detention facilities. All other custody or detention shall be provided by the 
division, or by contract with a public or private agency willing to undertake 
temporary custody or detention upon agreed terms, or in suitable premises 
distinct and separate from the general jails, lockups, or cells used in law 
enforcement and corrections systems. 
(7) A child who willfully and intentionally damages a jail or other place of 
confinement as provided in Section 76-8-418, including a detention, shelter, or 
secure confinement facility, operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services, commits an act which would be a third degree felony if committed by 
an adult. 
64-13-14.5. Limits of confinement place — Release status 
— Work release. 
(1) The department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of an 
inmate when, as established by department policies and procedures, there is 
cause to believe the inmate will honor his trust, by authorizing him under 
prescribed conditions: 
(a) to leave temporarily for purposes specified by department policies 
and procedures to visit specifically designated places for a period not to 
exceed 30 days; 
(b) to participate in a voluntary training program in the community 
while housed at a correctional facility or to work at paid employment; 
(c) to be housed in a nonsecure community correctional center operated 
by the department; or 
(d) to be housed in any other facility under contract with the depart-
ment. 
(2) The department shall establish rules governing offenders on release 
status. A copy of the rules shall be furnished to the offender and to any 
employer or other person participating in the offender's release program. Any 
employer or other participating person shall agree in writing to abide by the 
rules and to notify the department of the offender's discharge or other release 
from a release program activity, or of any violation of the rules governing 
release status. 
(3) The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended limits of 
his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an institutioii or 
facility designated by the department is an escape from custody. 
(4) If an offender is arrested for the commission of a crime, the arresting 
authority shall immediately notify the department of the arrest. 
(5) The department may impose appropriate sanctions upon offenders who 
violate rules, including prosecution for escape under Section 76-8-309 and for 
unauthorized absence. 
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure correctional facility and on work 
release may not be required to work for less than the current federally 
established minimum wage, or under substandard working conditions^ 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined [Effective until July 1, 2004]. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of 
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other 
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles 
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the 
confinement is legal. 
"Prisoner" defined [Effective July 1, 2004]. 
For purposes of tliis part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of 
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other 
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles 
operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regardless of whether the 
confinement is legal. 
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive 
sentences — Definitions. 
(1) (a) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without 
lawful authorization. 
(b) If a prisoner obtains authorization to leave official custody by means 
of deceit, fraud, or other artifice, the prisoner has not received lawful 
authorization. 
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an 
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes 
serious bodily injury to another. 
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony. 
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony. 
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section 
shall run consecutively with any other sentence. 
(7) For the purposes of this part: 
(a) "Confinement" means the prisoner is: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a 
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being sen-
tenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or 
housed in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the 
sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on 
parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or 
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of 
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in 
the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from 
work release or home visit by the time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes 
persons under trustee status. 
78-3a-114. Placement of minor in detention or shelter 
facility — Grounds — Detention hearings — Pe-
riod of detention — Notice — Confinement of 
minors for criminal proceedings — Bail laws 
inapplicable, exception [Effective July 1, 2004]. 
(1) (a) A minor may not be placed or kept in a secure detention facility-
pending court proceedings unless it is unsafe for the public to leave the 
minor with his parents, guardian, or custodian and the minor is 
detainable based on guidelines promulgated by the Division of Juvenile 
Justice Services. 
(b) A minor who must be taken from his home but who does not require 
physical restriction shall be given temporary care in a shelter facility and 
may not be placed in a detention facility 
(c) A minor may not be placed or kept in a shelter facility pending court 
proceedings unless it is unsafe for the minor to leave him with his parents, 
guardian, or custodian. 
(2) After admission to a detention facility pursuant to the guidelines 
established by the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and immediate 
investigation by an authorized officer of the court, the Judge or the officer shall 
order the release of the minor to his parents, guardian, or custodian if it is 
found he can be safely returned to their care, either upon written promise to 
bring the minor to the court at a time set or without restriction. 
(a) If the minor's parent, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the 
minor from a facility within 24 hours after notification of release, the 
parent, guardian, or custodian is responsible for the cost of care for the 
time the minor remains in the facility. 
(b) The facility shall determine the cost of care. 
(c) Any money collected under this Subsection (2) shall be retained by 
the Division of Juvenile Justice Services to recover the cost of care for the 
time the minor remains in the facility 
(3) (a) When a minor is detained in a detention or shelter facility, the 
parents or guardian shall be informed by the person in charge of the 
facility that they have the right to a prompt hearing in court to determine 
whether the minor is to be further detained or released. 
(b) Detention hearings shall be held by the judge or by a commissioner. 
(c) The court may, at any time, order the release of the minor, whether 
a detention hearing is held or not. 
(d) If the minor is released, and the minor remains in the facility, 
because the parents, guardian, or custodian fails to retrieve the minor, the 
parents, guardian, or custodian shall be responsible for the cost of care as 
provided in Subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c). 
(4) (a) A minor may not be held in a detention facility longer than 48 hours 
prior to a detention hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the 
court has entered an order for continued detention. 
(b) A minor may not be held in a shelter facility longer than 48 hours 
prior to a shelter hearing, excluding weekends and holidays, unless a court 
order for extended shelter has been entered by the court after notice to all 
parties described in Section 78-3a-306. 
(c) A hearing for detention or shelter may not be waived. Detention staff 
shall provide the court with all information received from the person who 
brought the minor to the detention facility. 
(d) If the court finds at a detention hearing that it is not safe to release 
the minor, the judge or commissioner may order the minor to be held in the 
facility or be placed in another appropriate facility, subject to further order 
of the court, 
(e) (i) After a detention hearing has been held, only the court may 
release a minor from detention. If a minor remains in a detention 
facility, periodic reviews shall be held pursuant to the Utah State 
Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure to ensure that 
continued detention is necessary. 
(ii) If the court orders home detention, it shall direct that notice of 
its order be provided to designated persons in the appropriate local 
law enforcement agency and the school or transferee school, if 
applicable, which the minor attends. The designated persons may 
receive the information for purposes of the minor's supervision and 
student safety. 
(iii) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency and the 
school which the minor attends who discloses the court's order of 
probation is not: 
(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud 
or malice as provided in Section 63-30-4; and 
(B) civilly or criminally liable except when disclosure consti-
tutes a knowing violation of Section 63-2-801. 
(5) A minor may not be held in a detention facility, following a dispositional 
order of the court for nonsecure substitute care as defined in Section 62A-4a-
101, or for community-based placement under Section 62A-7-101 for longer 
than 72 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. The period of detention may 
be extended by the court for one period of seven calendar days if: 
(a) the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or another agency respon-
sible for placement files a written petition with the court requesting the 
extension and setting forth good cause; and 
(b) the court enters a written finding that it is in the best interests of 
both the minor and the community to extend the period of detention. 
(6) The agency requesting an extension shall promptly notify the detention 
facility that a written petition has been filed. 
(7) The court shall promptly notify the detention facility regarding its initial 
disposition and any ruling on a petition for an extension, whether granted or 
denied. 
(8) (a) A minor under 16 years of age may not be held in a jail, lockup, or 
other place for adult detention except as provided by Section 62A-7-201 or 
unless certified as an adult pursuant to Section 78-3a-603. The provisions 
of Section 62A-7-201 regarding confinement facilities apply to this Sub-
section (8). 
(b) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition 
endangers the safety or welfare of others in the detention facility for 
minors may, by court order that specifies the reasons, be detained in 
another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court, includ-
ing a jail or other place of confinement for adults. However, a secure youth 
corrections facility is not an appropriate place of confinement for detention 
purposes under this section. 
(9) A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for 
the detention of adult offenders or persons charged with crime shall immedi-
ately notify the juvenile court when a minor who is or appears to be under 18 
years of age is received at the facility and shall make arrangements for the 
transfer of the minor to a detention facility, unless otherwise ordered by the 
juvenile court. 
(10) This section does not apply to a minor who is brought to the adult 
facility under charges pursuant to Section 78-3a-602 or by order of the juvenile 
court to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court under Section 
78-3a-603. 
(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-602 or 
78-3a-603 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults 
charged with crime. 
(12) Provisions of law regarding bail are not applicable to minors detained 
or taken into custody under this chapter, except that bail may be allowed: 
(a) if a minor who need not be detained lives outside this state; or 
(b) when a minor who need not be detained comes within one of the 
classes in Subsection 78-3a-503(ll). 
(13) Section 76-8-418 is applicable to a minor who willfully and intention-
ally commits an act against a jail or other place of confinement, including a 
Division of Juvenile Justice Services detention, shelter, or secure confinement 
facility which would be a third degree felony if committed by an adult. 
